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PT2 · Module 8

AD Exploitation & Persistence

Map privilege paths with BloodHound, roast tickets, abuse ACLs to DCSync, dump NTDS, forge golden/silver tickets, and persist across the domain.

~14 h 13 resources Last updated October 4, 2026

With a foothold and basic lateral movement from the previous module, PT2 expects you to escalate to Domain Admin, dump every credential, and persist in a way that survives password resets. This module covers the escalation primitives, the credential-harvesting workflow once you reach DA, and the persistence techniques that outlast reactive cleanup.

Mapping With BloodHound

BloodHound is the single most valuable AD enumeration tool. SharpHound collects on Windows, BloodHound.py and nxc collect from Linux. The graph reveals shortest paths from your current access to Domain Admin, exposes forgotten ACL weaknesses, and surfaces delegation misconfigurations. The edge reference is essential: knowing exactly what GenericWrite on a computer enables (RBCD) versus on a user (ForceChangePassword, Shadow Credentials) is what turns a graph edge into a real attack.

Kerberoasting And AS-REP Roasting

Service accounts with SPNs expose a crackable TGS; accounts with pre-auth disabled expose an AS-REP that cracks the same way. Targeted Kerberoasting via GenericWrite adds an SPN to a user you control, then roasts it.

ACL Abuse

GenericAll, GenericWrite, WriteOwner, WriteDACL, and ForceChangePassword each unlock a different takeover. Granting yourself DCSync via WriteDACL on the domain object is the classic shortcut from one weak ACE to Domain Admin.

DCSync And Credential Harvest

DCSync pulls the krbtgt hash and every account's NTLM. From there: NTDS.dit for the full forest dump, LAPS passwords for local-admin reuse, gMSA passwords for service-account access, and LSASS on reached hosts for session hijacking.

Golden And Silver Tickets

Golden ticket (krbtgt) forges any TGT for any user, domain-wide. Silver ticket (service account hash) forges service tickets without touching the DC, invisible to replication monitoring. Diamond ticket modifies an existing TGT in-place for stealth.

Persistence

Backdoor accounts in protected groups, DCSync rights on a hidden account, Shadow Credentials on key users, GenericAll on AdminSDHolder (restored to every protected object hourly), DSRM, and Skeleton Key each survive different cleanup actions. Choose by threat model.

Read

The core material for this module. Where a guide goes deeper than needed, the relevant sections are highlighted.

Practice

Apply the module hands-on.

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