Route53 and CloudFront Reconnaissance
Route53 and CloudFront leave distinct DNS fingerprints. Even without credentials, passive DNS and certificate transparency expose hosted zones, distribution endpoints, and dangling records.
CloudFront Distribution Fingerprinting
CloudFront distributions resolve to *.cloudfront.net. Identify which domains route through CloudFront:
d1234abcd.cloudfront.net. 1.2.3.4
A CNAME to *.cloudfront.net confirms CloudFront is in the path. Bulk check across subdomains:
Route53 DNS Fingerprints
Route53 nameservers follow a predictable pattern:
ns-123.awsdns-45.com
ns-678.awsdns-90.net
ns-1234.awsdns-56.org
ns-5678.awsdns-01.co.uk
Check if the target uses Route53:
ns-123.awsdns-45.com.
Route53-hosted zones mean DNS changes are API-driven — relevant for later attacks via Route53 API if you gain credentials.
Subdomain Enumeration
Filter for AWS-specific subdomains:
Subdomain Takeover via Dangling CNAMEs
Route53 and AWS services are common takeover targets. A CNAME pointing to an AWS endpoint that no longer exists is claimable.
High-value dangling targets:
Check for dangling CNAMEs:
[DANGLING] assets.example.com -> assets.example.com.s3.amazonaws.com.
Or use subjack:
Explain command
| -w subdomains.txt | File with subdomains to check. |
| -t 100 | Concurrent threads. |
API Gateway Endpoints
API Gateway public endpoints follow:
https://$API_ID.execute-api.$REGION.amazonaws.com/$STAGE/
Discover via JavaScript files, GitHub search, or Burp passive scanning:
API Gateway endpoints returning {"message":"Missing Authentication Token"} on / confirm the endpoint exists. Enumerate paths from there.
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