NetBIOS Information Disclosure
NetBIOS leaks infrastructure information without authentication — hostnames, domain or workgroup names, MAC addresses, logged-in usernames, and browse master roles. On local segments, the NBT-NS (NetBIOS Name Service) and LLMNR broadcast protocols create a poisoning surface that enables NTLM hash capture without any prior access. These are two distinct findings: passive information disclosure via queries, and active poisoning opportunity via unanswered broadcast name resolution.
Information Leaked Without Authentication
Pull what NetBIOS exposes before touching any authenticated service:
Looking up status of 10.10.10.50 WS01 <00> - B <ACTIVE> COMPANY <00> - <GROUP> B <ACTIVE> WS01 <20> - B <ACTIVE> JSMITH <03> - B <ACTIVE> COMPANY <1c> - <GROUP> B <ACTIVE> WS01 <1b> - B <ACTIVE> MAC Address = 00-11-22-33-44-55
This single unauthenticated query reveals: hostname (WS01), domain (COMPANY), logged-in username (JSMITH<03>), that File Sharing is active (<20>), that this host is the Domain Master Browser (<1b>), and the hardware MAC address. None of this requires credentials.
Logged-In Username Disclosure
The <03> suffix registers the currently logged-in username under the Messenger service. When present, it reveals an active account — high-value for password spraying:
JSMITH <03> - B <ACTIVE>
10.10.10.50 JSMITH 10.10.10.51 ADMINISTRATOR 10.10.10.55 SVCACCOUNT
ADMINISTRATOR logged in at 10.10.10.51 is an immediate priority target. SVCACCOUNT suggests a service account — often has weaker passwords and may have elevated privileges.
Browse Master Identification
The Domain Master Browser (<1b>) maintains the network browse list and is often the most active Windows machine on the segment — frequently a DC or file server:
WS01 <1b> - B <ACTIVE>
LLMNR and NBT-NS Poisoning Surface
When a Windows host cannot resolve a name via DNS, it falls back to multicast LLMNR (Link-Local Multicast Name Resolution) and broadcast NBT-NS queries. Any host on the segment can respond to these — this is the Responder attack surface. Confirm the protocols are active on the local segment by listening for broadcast traffic:
Important
Responder poisons broadcasts and affects all hosts on the segment. Only run on networks with explicit authorization. Passive listening with -A (analyze mode) is safe and leaves no poisoning trace.
[*] [LLMNR] Poisoned answer sent to 10.10.10.51 for name fileserver [*] [NBT-NS] Poisoned answer sent to 10.10.10.55 for name BACKUP
Analyze mode (-A) shows which names are being queried without actually responding — confirming the poisoning surface exists without triggering hash capture. Hosts querying for fileserver and BACKUP are failing DNS resolution and falling back to broadcast, which means they will accept a poisoned response. These names are also candidates for SMB share paths worth probing directly.
MAC Address and Vendor Identification
The MAC address in NetBIOS responses identifies the network interface vendor — useful for identifying virtual machines, specific hardware, and network segmentation:
10.10.10.10 00:50:56:01:23:45 10.10.10.50 00:11:22:33:44:55 10.10.10.51 00:0c:29:ab:cd:ef
VMware, Inc.
00:50:56 is a VMware OUI — hosts with this prefix are VMware virtual machines, common in CTF and lab environments. 00:0c:29 is also VMware. Knowing the environment is virtualized informs attack assumptions about shared storage and snapshot recovery.
The <20> suffix confirming file sharing is active is a direct pivot to SMB Null Session Enumeration. Usernames disclosed by NetBIOS feed directly into AD Password Spraying.
References
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LLMNR and NBT-NS poisoner with analyze mode for passive surface assessment
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Subnet NetBIOS scanning with MAC and logged-in user output
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