CVE-2006-2369 – RealVNC Authentication Bypass
RealVNC 4.1.0 and 4.1.1 allow a client to specify its preferred security type during the RFB handshake. The server accepts Type 1 - None even when it was not advertised as a supported option. Sending a None authentication request bypasses the password check entirely and grants full desktop access without credentials.
Affects RealVNC 4.1.0 and 4.1.1 on Windows. Also present in products embedding RealVNC including Cisco CallManager and AdderLink IP KVM switches. Still appears in OSCP labs and CTFs on older Windows machines.
Confirming Vulnerability
5900/tcp open vnc | realvnc-auth-bypass: | VULNERABLE: | RealVNC 4.1.0 - 4.1.1 Authentication Bypass | State: VULNERABLE | IDs: CVE:CVE-2006-2369
Manual Exploitation
Connect and press Enter at the password prompt without typing anything:
On vulnerable RealVNC 4.1.x servers this completes the bypass. If the client does not try None automatically, force it explicitly:
Metasploit Auxiliary Module
Warning
This may be restricted in exams such as OSCP. Verify exam rules before use.
use auxiliary/scanner/vnc/realvnc_auth_bypass set RHOSTS $TARGET_IP run
Non-Standard Ports
The bypass is in the RFB protocol negotiation — it works on any port. Specify the port directly:
What You Get
A full graphical session as the user running the VNC server. From the desktop, open a terminal for local enumeration and privilege escalation.
References
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realvnc-auth-bypass NSE Scriptnmap.org/nsedoc/scripts/realvnc-auth-bypass.html (opens in new tab)
Nmap Script documentation with vulnerable output example.
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